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THE ECONOMIC UNDERPINNINGS OF PATENT LAW
Kenneth W. Dam*
Patents play a crucial role in the economy. The economic principles
underlying the patent system have not always been well understood, especially
in the courts. In part, the difficulty lies in two circumstances: first, that innovation
is essentially the creation of information, which has different economic
characteristics from goods, and second, that the patent system, while effectively
dealing with this primary problem of the special nature of innovation,
nonetheless creates secondary economic problems. And in part the esoteric
nature of patent law has obscured the way in which patent law doctrines deal
with these secondary problems. This article, after analyzing the secondary
economic problems created by the patent solution to the information aspect of
innovation, will show in detail how patent law has effectively, if often
inarticulately, minimized the impact of these problems.
To start with, it is important to recognize the primary problem that the
patent system solves. This problem--often called the appropriability problem--is
that if a firm could not recover the costs of invention because the resulting
information were available to all, then we could expect a much lower and indeed
suboptimal level of innovation. In short, the patent system prevents others from
reaping where they have not sown and thereby promotes R&D investment in
innovation. The patent law achieves this laudable end by creating property rights
in inventions. In creating these property rights known as patents, however,
secondary problems are created that can lead to market distortions. To take the
most often discussed example, it is often said that since patent law gives the
patentee the power to exclude others from practicing the invention, a monopoly
may be created, leading to restriction of production, a supracompetitive price,
and what economists call an efficiency or deadweight loss.
It is the thesis of this article that patent law has used an economic approach
to minimize such potential distortions and inefficiencies. In most cases, this
economic approach has been adopted unconsciously. Although the failure to use
economic terms has obscured the economic contribution patent law has made,
we must recognize that the misuse of economic concepts can be a danger. For
example, the tendency to brandish economic terms, particularly the talisman of
*
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“monopoly,” led the Supreme Court seriously astray in the period stretching
from the 1930s to the 1970s. Though using an economic term, the Court was in
fact applying an essentially political doctrine.1 More recently, patent law
decisions have returned to a more soundly based approach.
In discussing the economic underpinnings of patent law, it is well to
remember that this branch of the law is based squarely on an economic policy
articulated in the Constitution. This policy, to promote “the Progress of Science
and the useful Arts,” can be thought of as an industrial policy in today’s terms
because it uses legal intervention to decide what technologies to promote.2 But
unlike most industrial policies it creates property rights in order to allow a
market system to function. And it chooses these technologies not by a process of
bureaucratic or political evaluation of which technologies are the most worthy of
government support but rather through a set of prior rules that create a system
determining when property rights will be created in inventions.
Patent law operates through legal doctrine, not through administrative
means. To be sure, the patent office necessarily uses administrative processes in
applying patent law doctrine. But unlike a typical economic regulatory agency it
does not normally hold trial-type hearings as a way of making or changing
policy. Nor does it normally use a rule-making process for particular industries
or technologies. Rather the patent office proceeds much like a court, applying the
principles of patent law on a case by case basis; the same is especially true of
courts reviewing patent office decisions and courts facing patent issues as an
original matter in infringement cases.
Whether the patent law approach is inherently preferable to a hearing or
rule-making based regulatory approach is beyond the scope of this paper, but
there is no apparent reason to believe that a regulatory approach would do
better. On the other hand, there is reason indeed to believe that the patent law
approach is preferable to a legislative approach that involved industry by
industry subsidies or other market advantages, especially in view of the rentseeking and pork barrel features of any legislative approach.3 The point of this
1

See discussion infra at pp. 21–22.
Art. I, §8, cl. 8. This clause of the Constitution, which seeks to secure “for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries,” is also
the basis for copyright protection. Trademark protection, in contrast, is based on the common
law, although the Lanham Act, which gives advantages to registrants, is based on the Commerce
Clause. Trade secret protection is based essentially on the law of contracts and torts. See David D.
Friedman, William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J.
of Econ. Perspectives 61 (1991). A Uniform Trade Secrets Act has been adopted in a number of
states.
3 A fourth possible approach to stimulating innovation is one commonly used in promoting basic
science through government subsidy--the peer review process used by the National Science
2
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article, however, is not to come to final conclusions on the relative advantages of
the patent law approach over the alternative regulatory and legislative
approaches to promoting innovation but rather to make clear the effectiveness of
the approach used in patent law.
I.
At the outset it is important to consider the three principal secondary
economic problems that patent law must face in solving the primary
appropriability problem. These three problems--which may for shorthand be
referred to as the monopoly, rent-seeking and inhibition-of-future-innovation
problems--are often put forward under one rubric or another as objections to
patents. After examining the nature and seriousness of these three problems, the
discussion will turn to how patent law doctrine in fact reduces their practical
impact.
1. The first problem is one that captured perhaps too much attention in the
1930’s-1970s period. That is that the right to exclude may create a monopoly.
Indeed, it became conventional to say that a patent is a monopoly.4 Nonetheless,
it is readily apparent that the right to exclude another from “manufacture, use
and sale” may give no significant market power, even when the patent covers a
product that is sold in the market. Indeed, without the benefit of empirical
research, it is entirely plausible to conclude that in the great bulk of instances no
significant market power is granted. We must bear in mind that leading
companies may obtain 1,000 or more patents in a single year,5 and yet many such
firms are unlikely ever to obtain even a single monopoly in any market.6
Nonetheless, many patents, especially those that achieve commercial success,
do result in the patentee enjoying economic rent.7 A patent that reduces the cost
Foundation and other governmental grant-making agencies. This approach has been used thus
far mostly for the promotion of basic science research. A fifth approach, often suggested but
seldom put into practice (except indirectly through Nobel prizes, Presidential medals and the
like) is a system of awards for innovations. Still a sixth possible approach--competitive bidding-is discussed briefly infra at 17–18.
4 See discussion infra at 21–22.
5 In 1991 the most frequent U.S. patentee received 1,156 patents and even the tenth most frequent
received 680 patents. Global Innovation: Who’s in the Lead, Business Week 68 (Aug. 3, 1992).
6 On the great variability in the value of patents, see Wesley M. Cohen and Richard C. Levin,
Empirical Studies of Innovation and Market Structure, in Richard Schmalensee and Robert D.
Willig, Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. II, pp. 1059, 1062-1064 (1989).
7 It is worth recalling, however, that the commercial success of the product may be more a result
of superior marketing, management, and similar factors than of the invention itself. Robert P.
Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 803 (1988).
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of making a product will permit the patentee to enjoy economic rent. To be sure,
this statement assumes that other producers are not able to use the innovation to
reduce cost, but that is precisely the purpose of the power to exclude from
“manufacture, use and sale” granted by a patent. The economic rent received by
the patentee is, in the normal case, measured by the difference between the
patentee’s per unit costs and competitors per unit costs (to the extent attributable
to the patented innovation) multiplied by the patentee’s volume.8
Economic rents are common in the economy. They are enjoyed wherever an
economic actor has a cost advantage that competitors cannot match, for legal or
other reasons. A legal reason might be some form of regulatory constraint or a
subsidy, stemming for example from some form of industrial policy. But rents
may arise from more natural causes. The advantage of superior location is a
common example in real estate. Superior talent in the arts and professional
sports is another.
The concept of economic rent is a more useful concept than monopoly for
analyzing patent law. In the typical patent case production will either remain the
same or increase compared to the pre-patent situation.9 As a result of the
invention, protected by the patent, the inventor has a cost advantage that allows
him to make more money--economic rent--than his competitors. In that sense
there is no restriction of production and hence no monopoly.
Of course, if we assume that the innovation were open to all, then all
producers would gain the same cost advantage and the economic rent would be
competed away; production would rise as cost fell, and in that sense one could
say that the patent restricts production and causes a deadweight loss. But even in
this second case we can discern that the term monopoly does not add to our
understanding. In the first place, the R&D that led to the invention might never
have occurred in the absence of the incentive of patentability. Second, even if the
invention had occurred, the inventor might have chosen, assuming the
circumstances permitted (say, in the case of a process patent), to keep the
invention a trade secret, in which case calling the patent a monopoly makes an
assumption of fact that it not justified. And third, as noted above, if the patented

8

Where the patentee licenses the patent, royalties are the mechanism by which the economic rent
is collected.
9 Output will expand compared to the pre-patent position if the reduction in cost occasioned by
the invention is sufficiently large: With minor discoveries, consumers continue to buy the same
quantity at the same price, so they are unaffected by the discovery. With major discoveries, price
falls and quantity rises so that consumer surplus rises. Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff,
Modern Industrial Organization 679 (1990). See more generally id. at 666–79, including Figure
20.3(b) and accompanying discussion.
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invention lowers cost sufficiently, then output will expand beyond the preinvention level, thereby rendering the conclusion that patents restrict production
at odds with observed fact.10 For these reasons, it would be more useful to
restrict the concept of monopoly to circumstances where the patents are used as a
device to mask what one would otherwise call a monopoly11 or where patent
licenses are used, as in certain classic antitrust cases, as a device for
implementing anticompetitive agreements.12 Not only do the antitrust laws
attempt to look through such subterfuges to penalize underlying anticompetitive
behavior but the patent law itself limits any monopoly profits that might be
derived from patents.13
2. Using the term economic rent rather than monopoly promotes clearer
thinking, but it does not eliminate economic policy issues. On the contrary,
because a patent’s right to exclude is bestowed by deliberate government policy,
the magnitude of the rent seeking that ensues deserves to be examined as a
matter of economic policy in weighing the costs and benefits of the patent
system. By rent seeking, we mean simply that firms and individuals will invest
resources to obtain patents (not just in the process of obtaining a patent but also
in the research and development to make the invention). The social harm from
rent seeking has been analogized by Landes and Posner to the search for lost
treasure; allowing any and all parties to search for the same treasure may involve
a waste of scarce resources.14
Rent seeking is undeniably a general problem in the economy, and not just in
patents, but in relation to patents it can easily be overemphasized. In high
technology industries, for example, investment in research and development is
itself a major form of competition and leads directly to consumer benefits in the
form of new products and lower prices. This result may be treated analytically as
lower costs to the innovator but from a dynamic viewpoint may have an even
more important consequence for the economy--the ability of customers to obtain
10

For an article reaching the same conclusion with respect to the weaknesses of the concept of
monopoly with respect to patents, but using a somewhat different line of argument, see Edmund
W. Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights, 8 Res. in Law and Econ. 31 (1986).
11 See e.g., SCM v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1205 (2d. Cir. 1981).
12 See the interpretation of United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), in Richard A.
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 292 (4th ed. 1992).
13 See discussion infra at pp. 11–14.
14 William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.
Law and Econ. 265, 267-268 (1987). See also Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, Rev.
of Econ. and Stat., Vol. L, p. 348 (1968). A further aspect of rent seeking beyond unnecessary
duplication of R&D expenditures is that the race for the patent will cause R&D expenditures to be
made at a faster than optimal rate. See George S. Tolley, James H. Hodge and Mark A. Grenchik,
The Economics of R&D Policy 177–78 (1985).
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inputs to their own production that permit them to achieve what they could
never accomplish before. The expansion of output and the reduction in price
achieved through technological progress resulting from research and
development may be quite remarkable, far beyond any possible social loss from
rent seeking. For example, Rappaport and Halevi found that in the computer
industry, as a result of “the relentless advance of its own technology,” prices to
end-users measured in MIPS (millions of instructions per second) fell from about
$250,000 in 1980 to less than $2,500 in 1990.15
In some industries, moreover, the pace of research and development and the
market interdependencies between inventions may be such that firms choose to
cross-license their competitors. Taking the computer industry once more as an
example, firms cross-license most product patents, including future patents, for
an agreed period. They do so because they value freedom of action more highly
than either exclusive use or royalty income. For such firms economic advantage
comes directly from being the first to the market with the application of a
discovery rather than from being able to exclude a competitor. Even though side
payments between two computer firms based on the relative strength of their
patent portfolios are common, it is hard to attach much importance to any rentseeking “waste” resulting from the research and development competition of
firms in such industries.
Finally, rent seeking stemming from the patent system should, in public
policy discussions, be placed in perspective with the rent seeking that would
undeniably stem from other forms of industrial policy. If government chooses to
promote the fortunes of one industry, or one firm, at the expense of another
through subsidies, licensing or similar interventionist policies, then rent seeking
is inescapable. Moreover, the resources expended in obtaining those government
benefits would be unlikely to have the dynamic benefits that one observes from
competition in research and development.
Nonetheless, rent seeking is to some as yet unmeasured extent a concomitant
of a patent system. As we shall see, a number of patent law doctrines have the
effect of reducing rent seeking behavior.16
3. A third problem faced by the patent system in promoting innovation is
achieving an appropriate flow of innovation over time. As we shall see, overly
broad patent protection can inhibit future innovation. Therefore, it is useful to
think of this third problem as seeking an economically optimal balance between

15

Andrew S. Rappaport and Shmuel Halevi, The Computerless Computer Company, Harvard
Business Review 69, 70 (July-Aug. 1991). For comparable data on a much earlier period and for an
explanation, see Gregory C. Chow, 42 Am. Econ. Rev. 1117 (1967).
16 See discussion infra at pp. 17–19.
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innovation today and innovation tomorrow. Patent law has a number of rules
that help to solve that problem.17
II.
Before beginning the analysis of how patent law meets the three principal
problems discussed in the prior section, it is essential to make clear how patent
law relies on property concepts to achieve its ends. As we shall see, the statute is
clear on this point, but the Supreme Court has, from an economic point of view,
somewhat muddied the property characteristics of a patent. Nonetheless, the
patent system today is undeniably a property rights system.
The Patent Act straightforwardly declares that “patents shall have the
attributes of personal property.” Among these attributes is the right of alienation,
known as assignment. As in the case with many other forms of property, there is
a recording system for assignments. Failure to record makes an assignment “void
as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration,
without notice.”18
Patents differ from many forms of property in that they come into existence
through an administrative proceeding, a patent proceeding in the Patent and
Trademark Office of the Department of Commerce. One seeking a patent files an
application, containing a specification (describing the invention and how to make
and use it) and one or more claims (pointing out and distinctly claiming the
subject matter of the invention, somewhat analogous to the metes and bounds of
real property).19 The application is assigned to a patent examiner who, aided by
references in the application and information in the patent office files, proceeds
to examine whether the invention is entitled to a patent.20 In applying statutory
criteria for patentability, he will be interested in prior patents and other “prior
art” (that is, prior sale, description in a publication and the like) that may
demonstrate that the putative invention lacks novelty (i.e., is not a new
invention) or would have been obvious to one skilled in the particular technical
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See discussion infra at pp. 19–20.
35 USC. §261. For precision in exposition, this article deals exclusively with U.S. patent law.
While there are major differences among national patent systems, the similarities dominate over
differences.
19 35 USC. §112. On claims drafting practice, see Robert H. Choate, William H. Francis, and
Robert C. Collins (eds.), Cases and Materials on Patent Law 422-426 (3d ed. 1987).
20 The Patent and Trademark Office is a high-volume organization. In Fiscal 1991 over 178,000
patent applications were filed and just over 100,000 patents were issued. At the end of that fiscal
year the office had 1,890 patent examiners. Average “pendency time” for patent applications was
about 18 months. Annual Report, Patent and Trademark Office 22 (Fiscal ‘91).
18
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art or otherwise fails to meet the statutory criteria for patentability.21 The
applicant and the patent examiner will normally communicate with each other in
a formal way under Patent Office procedures,22 but the public or even other
applicants in a particular field are not advised of the application by the Patent
Office, either by publication or otherwise. In that sense, a patent proceeding is an
ex parte proceeding and a secret one to boot.23 However, when two patent
applications conflict, an interference is declared, and a special board is invoked to
deal with patentability issues and, in particular, to determine which invention
has priority; in that situation, the parties to the interference become aware of the
other’s application.24
Because a patent proceeding is generally ex parte, an invention cannot
normally be challenged as unpatentable except in court proceedings after
issuance of the patent.25 Normally such a challenge first arises when the patentee
sues for infringement and the alleged infringer raises invalidity as a defense.
And because of the ex parte character of patent proceedings, the courts have
placed a high premium on not only the truthfulness of the applicant’s statements
but also the completeness of those statements with regard to prior art. Thus,
misrepresentation by the applicant or failure to disclose material information
may lead not only to the invalidity of the entire patent26 but also an antitrust
violation.27
Remedies for infringement of a patent are, with limited exceptions, those
appropriate for property. Injunctions, both permanent and temporary, are

21

35 USC. §§ 102-103.
Communication between applicant and examiner in the course of “prosecution” is normally in
writing. 35 C.F.R. §1.2. After the first official action by an examiner an “interview” between a
representative of the applicant and the examiner is possible. 37 C.F.R. §1.33. Telephone calls are
permitted in limited situations. Manual of Patent Examining Procedure §713.01-05 (5th ed. 1989);
see Donald S. Chisum, Patents, Vol. 3, §11.03[2][a](1992).
23 Under 35 USC. §122, applications are to be kept in confidence. Even the Freedom of
Information Act does not provide authority for disclosure; rather applications are materials
“specifically exempted from disclosure by statute” under 5 USC. §552(b)(3). Iron & Sears v. Dann,
606 F.2d 1215 (D.C.Cir. 1979).
24 The applicant may appeal a rejection by the examiner to a Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences within the Patent Office. On intra-Patent Office appeals and on appeals to the
Federal courts, see generally Chisum, supra note 22, at Vol. 3, §11.06 (1992).
25 Limited exceptions, beyond interference proceedings just discussed, are so-called “public use”
proceedings and protests. See Chisum, supra note 22, at Vol. 3, §11.03[3].
26 J. P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
27 Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 US 172 (1965).
22
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available against infringers upon proof of validity and infringement.28 To be sure,
patents can be invalidated in a judicial proceeding if they should not have been
issued by the patent office in the first place, but title to other forms of property
can also be nullified in court. Further, patents can be rendered unenforceable for
reasons other than that they should not have been issued; the most common
example is patent misuse.29 In any event, statutes increasingly call for forfeiture
of tangible property for certain kinds of misconduct.30 Legal differences between
patents and other forms of property can therefore easily be exaggerated.
The status of a patent as property is nonetheless qualified, from an analytic
point of view, by the measure of damages for infringement. The rule for damages
is a mixed property and liability rule.31 Until the Supreme Court decision in Aro
Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. ,32 the rule was that the
patentee was entitled to the infringer’s profits from the infringement.33 That was
a property rule of damages. In the Aro Manufacturing case, Justice Brennan,
speaking for only four members of the Court, interpreted a 1946 amendment to
the Patent Act to require that the recovery be limited to the patentee’s losses.34
This limitation, in contrast, is a liability rule. No matter that neither the language
of the statute nor the legislative history required this change in the law. As in
other cases we shall come to, the Supreme Court found a way to limit the
strength of the patent right by limiting its value in infringement litigation.
For a number of reasons, however, the Aro limitation may not be as
important as the liability/property rule dichotomy might suggest. In the first
place, since a patentee may seek an injunction, including a preliminary injunction
pending trial, the patentee will normally be able to bring an infringer to the
bargaining table where the parties will have an incentive to agree to license or
even assign the patent right to the infringer if he can more efficiently exploit the
patent. Of course, an action will not normally be brought until some damages
have accrued, since it is through sales of an infringing product that the patentee
28

See generally Chisum, supra note 22, at Vol. 5, §20.04(1992). On the requisites of an antitrust
violation based on fraud on the Patent Office, see Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752
F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.).
29 See discussion infra at 14.
30 The U.S. Criminal Code calls for forfeiture of both real and personal property which is an
instrumentality in the commission of certain crimes having to do with narcotics and racketeering.
21 USC. §§853(a)(2) and 881(a)(7). See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Co., 416 US 663 (1974), and
David J. Fried, Rationalizing Criminal Forfeiture, 79 J. of Crim. Law and Criminology 328 (1988).
31 On property and liability rules, see Guido Calebresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).
32 377 US 476 (1964).
33 Westinghouse Elec. and Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. and Mfg. Co., 225 US 604, 614 (1912).
34 377 US 476, 503-507 (1964).
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normally learns of the infringement of a product patent; and even a temporary
injunction cannot be obtained until a clear showing of validity and infringement
has been made as a preliminary matter.35
A more important limitation on the Aro liability rule is that the statute itself
and subsequent lower court, including Federal Circuit, decisions sharply limit
that precedent. The statute provides that the recovery cannot be less than a
reasonable royalty,36 and the Federal Circuit has held that the infringer’s
anticipated profits are a factor in determining a reasonable royalty.37 In addition,
the Patent Act permits a court to award treble damages for willful infringement.
While the Aro precedent can still be considered to some uncertain extent a
qualification of the property rule for recovery, one can nevertheless postulate an
efficiency justification for Aro. If the infringer is more efficient than the patentee,
say as a manufacturer of the patented product, then in principle the former will
be able to manufacture and sell, pay damages measured by the loss to the
patentee, and still be ahead. Nonetheless, the Aro rule is misguided in its
approach because, as noted above, the patentee’s ability to seek an injunction in
those circumstances would provide a basis for negotiation, and if the infringer
can put the patent to more profitable use than the patentee, one can anticipate
that the patentee will have an incentive to license the patent to him, making both
of the parties better off.38
III.
35

On the “clear showing” of validity and infringement required for preliminary injunctive relief,
see Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Chemicals, 773 F.2d 1230, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 1985). On whether this
newer standard is stricter than the normal Federal rule for preliminary injunctions in nonpatent
matters (as was once the case), see Robert Patrick Merges, Patent Law and Practice 756-759 (1991).
36 35 USC. §284.
37 TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Moreover, the infringer’s actual
profits can be used to prove anticipated profits. Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons,
Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1568 (Fed. Cir.1984). Quite large damage awards have followed these
developments. See Lawrence G. Kastriner, The Revival of Confidence in the Patent System, 37 J.
of Pat. Off. Soc. 5, 14-15 (1991).
38 It is by no means certain that the patentee and the infringer will actually reach agreement and
certainly not that they will do so promptly. The patentee and infringer are in a position that
economists refer to as “bilateral monopoly” and though both have much to gain by agreement in
the situation postulated, each individually would have more to gain if he could capture a
disproportionate share of the potential saving. As a consequence the negotiation between them is
likely to be strenuous and complicated with a good deal of “strategic behavior,” and will quite
possibly in the end lead to no agreement at all, to the detriment of both. See the explicit and
detailed discussion of this problem by Judge Posner in a nonpatent context involving however
both a property right and an injunction in Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Property Co., 966 F.2d 273
(7th Cir. 1992).
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Turning to the patent law’s treatment of the first principal economic problem
outlined above, we find that although patents are property rights, both courts
and academics have been prone to refer to them as monopolies. This tendency
has led to mischief in the Supreme Court,39 but nonetheless we shall see that
patent law contains a number of doctrines that limit any monopoly profits.
In analyzing the patent system, most economists, recognizing that patents
are essential to stimulate innovation, have focused on the question of the optimal
life of a patent. Nordhaus argued that “a longer life means that the monopoly on
information lasts longer and thus there are some losses from inefficiencies
associated with monopoly.” He therefore sought to balance the monopoly
inefficiencies with the “larger amount of output for a given level of inputs”
generated by the incremental investment stimulated by a patent.40 Other
economists have pointed out that length is but one dimension of a patent and
that breadth is equally important.41
The issue of patent length is resolved by legislation--seventeen years from
date of grant.42 This legislative limitation is cemented through the judicially
created double patenting rule. When a new patent would, by overlaying an
applicant’s earlier patent, lead to a power to exclude that would extend beyond
the seventeen years’ duration of the latter, the patent application will be rejected,
unless the applicant files a “terminal disclaimer” limiting the term of the new
patent to the expiration date of the earlier patent. The economic purpose is to
“prevent the extension of the term of a patent.”43
Although the basic term is seventeen years, several qualifications should be
noted. First, the term can be extended in certain cases where regulatory review
has delayed commercial marketing of a product (as in the case of Federal Drug
Administration regulation of pharmaceuticals).44 On the other hand, rules
inducing early filing of patent applications45 may result in the patent issuing, and
39

See discussion infra at pp. 21–22.
William D. Nordhaus, Invention, Growth and Welfare 76 (1969). For other elaborations of the
Nordhaus approach, see F. M. Scherer and David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and
Economic Performance 625 n. 30 (3d ed. 1990).
41 E.g., Richard Gilbert and Carl Shapiro, Optimal patent length and breadth, 21 RAND J. of Econ.
106 (1990); Paul Klemperer, How broad should the scope of patent protection be?, 21 RAND J. of
Econ. 113 (1990).
42 35 USC. §154.
43 In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Terminal disclosures are provided for in the general
disclaimer provisions of the Patent Act, 35 USC. §253. For more on the double patenting doctrine,
see Merges, supra note 35 at 636-638.
44 35 USC. §156.
45 See discussion infra at p. 18.
40
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hence the term beginning to run, well before the patentee has developed a
commerciably viable product, thereby de facto shortening the period in which
the product is protected.46 This latter limitation on de facto length is of major
practical importance because many fundamental patents are not successfully
commercialized for a decade or even substantially longer after issuance.47
Unlike the patent length issue, the breadth issue is not addressed explicitly
in the Patent Act. Rather it is resolved by the courts implicitly in interpreting a
particular patent’s claims and in giving content to a variety of patent law
doctrines. One of those doctrines is the doctrine of equivalents, which permits an
action for infringement in limited circumstances even though no literal
infringement of the claims as written has occurred.48 This doctrine, which finds
infringement where a device “performs substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to obtain the same result”49 as a patented device, is
designed to deal with “competitors who appropriate the essence of an invention
while barely avoiding the literal language of the claims.”50 The doctrine of
equivalents cannot be used, however, to include what would not have been
patentable.51 On the contrary, its main effect from the standpoint of breadth is to
give broad scope to pioneer inventions while limiting the scope of mere
improvements.52
This first set of doctrines is patent law’s answer to those who object that
although a power to exclude may be justified for a major invention, there is no
reason to grant seventeen years of monopoly profits to one who invents
something that would have been invented anyway by someone else in a few
46

Because of the disclosure requirements discussed infra at p. 20, competitors are likely to be in
the position to market a competing product immediately upon expiration of the legal term.
Where regulatory testing would be required, the competitor is even entitled under 35 USC.
§271(e)(1) to make, use and sell even during the patent period in order to obtain regulatory
approval to compete immediately after expiration of the statutory period. Eli Lilly and Co. v.
Medtronic Inc., 496 US 661 (1990).
47 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. of L. and Econ. 265,
272 (Table I) (1977).
48 See generally Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 Col. L. Rev. 839 (1990).
49 Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 US 30, 42 (1929).
50 London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
51 Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Associates, 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The
doctrine of equivalents cannot, for example, extend the scope of protection “to encompass
anything in the prior art,” Senmed, Inc. v. Richard-Allan Medical Industries, Inc., 888 F.2d 815,
821 (Fed. Cir. 1989), or to grant protection encompassing a claim surrendered in Patent Office
proceedings, see Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 862-863 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
52 Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983). See discussion in
Chisum, supra note 22, at Vol. 4, §18.04[2}; and Merges, supra note 35, at 699–705 (1992).
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years. As we have just seen, patent law does in fact make a major distinction
between landmark inventions and lesser inventions. To be sure, the distinction
operates on the breadth rather than the length dimension of the patent grant. But
patent length is prescribed by statute, and what is remarkable is that patent law
doctrine achieves a somewhat similar result by operating on the dimension open
to it--breadth.53
A second set of doctrines serves to restrict de facto breadth to allow for
innovations that might be thought to be governed by the literal claims of a prior
patent. For example, the doctrine of equivalents just considered may also operate
in reverse to narrow scope where “a device is so far changed in principle from a
patented article that it performs the same or a similar function in a substantially
different way.” 54 Similarly, new and nonobvious uses of a known product may
be patentable as a process patent,55 thereby de facto limiting the scope of an
existing product patent so that it does not, in the circumstances, deter
innovation.56 Still another example is that an inventor who improves upon a
prior patented innovation may be entitled to an improvement patent on the
subject matter of an existing patent.57 The second patentee may not be able to
exploit the improvement patent without a license from the first patentee, but
neither can the first patentee use the improvement without a license from the
53

A critic might still object that although the amount of “monopoly profits” (determined by
length times breadth) may be reduced by a roughly comparable amount by the pioneer versus
lesser invention distinction described in the text, it is still wrong to exclude competitors for the
full seventeen year term. This emphasis on length of protection perhaps arises from the classroom
tendency to focus on one invention and one patent at a time. If the invention is indeed a minor
one, in the sense that it was going to occur in a few years anyway, then it is likely that coming
along behind it in another few years is another invention and, on the assumption that the first
patent results in monopoly profits, the second patent is likely to displace the first from the market
or at least to deprive the first of monopoly profits during the remainder of the nominal seventeen
year term. (Of course, minor innovations--whether the first or the second--are more likely to run
afoul of the nonobviousness requirement of 35 USC. §103 and thereby to be unpatentable.) In
short, another way of looking at the relation between patent term and monopoly profits is that
the seventeen year term is a legal concept, not necessarily an economic reality.
54 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 US 605, 608 (1950). Indeed, new and
unobvious uses of a known product may be patentable as a process patent, Chisum, supra note
22, at Vol. 1, §1.03[8], thereby limiting the scope of an existing product patent so that it does not,
in the circumstances, deter innovation. See Merges, supra note 35, at 154 (1992).
55 35 U..S.C. §100(b). See Chisum, supra note 22, at Vol. 1, §1.03[8] (1992).
56 Merges, supra note 35, at 154 (1992), gives as a hypothetical example a patented leather tanning
compound that turns out to be an effective anti-AIDS drug. Not only can the discoverer of the
new use obtain a process patent, thereby advancing innovation, but the existing product patentee
gains as well because a product patent license must be obtained to practice the process. Id. at 154.
See note 58 infra and accompanying text.
57 35 USC. §101.
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improvement patentee. A likely result of this mutual blocking situation is a
negotiation to allow both patents to be used.58
A third set of doctrines may be applied to reduce monopoly profits wherever
they may be thought to exist. While leaving length at seventeen years and not
formally touching breadth, they nevertheless restrict use of any monopoly
power. The rules dealing with price-fixing, tie-ins, and the like cluster under the
banner of patent misuse.59 Because patent misuse has become de facto a branch
of antitrust law,60 its impact goes well beyond the scope of this article, but there
is no doubt that many concerns, real and imagined, about monopoly arising from
patents can be addressed by the misuse doctrine.
A final set of doctrines may be considered as narrowing the breadth of
patents, albeit in an extreme sense. These are the doctrines that lead to no patent
being issued: novelty, utility and nonobviousness.61 Referring to these doctrines
as limiting patent breadth might be thought a semantic trick, since denial of a
patent would be equated to zero breadth. However, these same doctrines can be
used to invalidate only certain claims in a patent, thereby limiting its scope to
what is truely new, useful and not obvious to one skilled in the art. When so
used, these doctrines thus reduce the scope of any resulting monopoly.
IV.
We have already seen that monopoly is a confusing concept when applied to
patents because the grant of a patent need not lead to a monopoly in the sense of
market power. We have also seen that economic rent is a more useful concept
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See discussion in Merges, supra note 35, at 724–30 (1992).
That the patent misuse doctrine may reduce a patentee’s profit is not to say that this is a wise
use of the doctrine in every case. Take the case of tie-ins, which are often analyzed as a method of
price discrimination and practiced by a patentee because they are in the circumstances the least
expensive method of discrimination available to him. See, e. g., Richard A. Posner and Frank H.
Easterbrook, Antitrust 802-806 (2d ed. 1981). Since “there is no prohibition against a patent
owner’s using price discrimination to maximize his income from the patent,” USM Corp. v. SPS
Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982), it makes little sense to prohibit the practice
through the indirect technique of a tie-in.
60 A great overlap betwen the patent misuse doctrine and the antitrust doctrine of the same name
should not obscure the fact that the patent doctrine “arose before there was any significant body
of antitrust law, and reached maturity long before that law...attained its present broad scope.”
MSM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.).
61 35 USC. §101 (“useful”), §102 (‘Novelty”), and §103 (“Non-Obvious Subject Matter”). For an
introductory treatment, see Donald S. Chisum and Michael A. Jacobs, Understanding Intellectual
Property Law §2C[2]-[4] (1992).
59

14

than monopoly. A strong theme in the law and economics literature is that rent
seeking is primarily wasteful and should be minimized.
In considering how the rent seeking minimization approach applies in the
patent context, it is worth keeping in mind several considerations. In particular,
the implication that rent is all waste is wide of the mark. Economic rent is the
price paid by the patent system to deal with the appropriability problem. In the
context of the normal classroom case of one invention covered by one patent, the
patent is a necessary institution to induce the R&D investment necessary for the
invention and therefore economic rent is inescapable.62 Moreover, when one
thinks of patent law as a form of industrial policy and is therefore concerned
with R&D activities of firms and industries within the economy, several practical
observations sets the rent seeking analysis in a more realistic context than the
typical classroom discussion.
In industry, and particularly in high-technology industry, a steady stream of
R & D investments is required if a firm is to remain in business. Long-run
marginal cost for its innovations is definitely positive, and it must price products,
patented or not, to recover this cost over time. Conceptually this is the same
point as in the one-invention, one-patent case, but the impact of the absence of
patent protection on R&D expenditures is more intuitively obvious, in part
perhaps because certain widely-held assumptions about a lone inventor’s nonmonetary motivations no longer intrude on the discussion. The industrial model
also highlights the fact that the classroom assumption of zero marginal costs after
invention gives a truncated picture of the industrial nature of innovation. Many
companies have found the cost of communicating the actual information
necessary to move an invention out of the laboratory and onto the factory floor
and from there to the marketplace to be high indeed, sometimes prohibitively
high.63 At a theoretical level one may avoid this practical complication by saying
that it is unpatentable know-how that is the costly thing to communicate (as
opposed to the abstract invention, which remains costless to communicate). But
the fact is that many companies spend a great deal of money trying to reduce a
patented invention to a marketable product.
In any case, taking the issue presented in economics discussions as
applicable in important cases, the rent-seeking problem is how to avoid a waste
of resources as economic actors compete to obtain an exclusive right to collect
62

See discussion supra at pp. 1 and 3–4.
For management perspectives on the difficulties of bridging the gulf between R&D and success
in product markets, see John Seely Brown, Research that Reinvents the Corporation, 69 Harv.
Bus. Rev. 102 (1991); William Taylor, The Business of Innovation, 68 Harv. Bus. Rev. 97 (1990); T.
Michael Nevens, Gregory L. Summe, and Bro Uttal, Commericalizing Technology: What the Best
Companies Do, 68 Harv. Bus. Rev. 154 (1990).
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economic rent. Expenditures to obtain a valuable patent right can take two main
forms, expenditures of resources in the patenting process itself and R&D
expenditures.
With respect to the costs of the patenting process, these are on the whole an
inevitable cost of the administration of a particular property rights system,
analogous to a registration system for other kinds of property or the use of the
court system to enforce property rights. In fact, where the right to the patent is
clear and there are no interference proceedings within the patent office, the cost
per patent is relatively modest.64 Where substantial costs arise is where there is a
dispute over the infringement of patents. Most of these costs are part and parcel
of a more general problem of the high costs of litigation, especially in the United
States, and are not peculiar to patents.65 Land too may cost nothing to produce,
but litigation over boundaries or title may be equally expensive where the stakes
are high.
As to the second aspect of waste from rent seeking, duplication of R&D
expenditures as parties race for the Holy Grail of a patent, the law has crafted a
number of doctrines that work to minimize such expenditures. Before examining
those doctrines, however, it is well to note that rent seeking is to some extent
another word for competition. Firms within an industry compete through
research and development. In a number of industries as much as 10 percent or
sometimes considerably more of sales may be devoted to product and process
innovation. Indeed, many resulting innovations do not lead to patents. Trade
secret protection plays some role, but much innovative activity receives its
business justification simply by permitting the firm to reach the market first with
a product (or in most industries a new feature of an established product); other
firms are sure to follow but only after the time required for copying or reverse
engineering.
Yet even if all R&D were to be eventually encapsulated in patents, it would
not follow that all duplicative R&D should be considered wasteful. By analogy,
we do not normally consider the opening of a new gasoline station or grocery
store near an existing one to be an example of waste, or at least not one with
which public policy should be concerned, even though we believe that only one
64

Patent Office fees have risen, however, as the Patent Office has become fully user-fee funded.
Patent and Trademark Office, Annual Report 2 (Fiscal ‘91). The fee structure is complicated but in
the simplest case involves a $690 filing fee and a $1130 issuance fee (less for small entities). 37
C.F.R. §§1.16, 1.18. The introduction of periodic maintenance fees, at an escalating rate, for
maintaining an issued patent in force also plays a role. 37 C.F.R. §1.20. Of course, these fees may
be dwarfed by legal costs in drafting the claims and prosecuting the patent, not to speak of
enforcing it subsequently against infringers if legal action is necessary.
65 Report of the Advisory Comm. on Patent Law Reform 75-80 (1992).
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can survive and we know that some economic rent of location may accrue to the
survivor. Rather we consider the competition induced by the new entrant to lead
to a better outcome than would accrue through legal protection of the existing
firm. So too we cannot have much confidence that some of the natural
alternatives to competition in R&D would increase social welfare. One could, for
example, use competitive bidding to choose the semiconductor firm to develop
the next generation of computer memory chips and thereby capture any
economic rents from patents derived. Or a government agency could simply
contract, after competitive bidding, for delivery of a drug yet to be discovered
with specified desirable medicinal properties (by analogy to military
procurement contracts calling for delivery of aircraft with as yet unattained
performance characteristics).
Both of these examples involve competitive bidding, which is normally a
superior method of dealing with economic rent consequences of allocating scarce
rights.66 But competitive bidding suffers from two possible infirmities in
innovation situations: the difficulty of defining exactly what it is that is to be
allocated exclusively (since we cannot easily define an invention before it has
occurred) and the likelihood of a great deal of rent seeking in the form of efforts
to influence governmental choice (witness defense contracting in the United
States). Hence, when we consider the alternatives, it seems unwise to condemn
competitive R&D as undesirable rent seeking.
Recognizing then that rent seeking can be exaggerated as a problem, it is
worth remarking how patent law limits rent seeking without notably
discouraging desirable competitive R&D activities. The patent issuance system
itself has the effect of transmitting knowledge that a new patent has been issued
and that, the scope of the invention having been captured, R&D of other firms
can be terminated or redirected. Moreover, the disclosure required in a patent
application, once made public by the issuance of the patent, may convey
important technical information that will allow other firms to climb onto the
patentee’s shoulders in seeking improvements or wholly new inventions.
An entirely different approach to reducing rent seeking is to be found in the
nonobviousness requisite. Because this statutory requirement eliminates patents
on low-contribution discoveries, it thereby eliminates one form of competition
that may be considered wasteful.67 After all, a patent on something obvious may
66

See the analysis of the allocation of rights to exploit publicly owned resources in Kenneth W.
Dam, Oil Resources (1976).
67 Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standard for Patents, 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev.
293. I use the term “low contribution” rather than “low cost” because the nonobviousness
requirement is not concerned with the costs incurred by the patent applicant in coming up with
the putative invention. What counts is whether the contribution made to the economy is sufficient
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nonetheless be worth a great deal due to the power to exclude others. And the
very obviousness of the invention may lead a correspondingly large number of
inventors to seek the prize of a patent.
Other doctrines of patent law bear on rent seeking. For example, rules
favoring early applications for patents tend to reduce rent seeking by inducing
early elimination or redirection of R&D by rival firms upon issuance.68 Rules on
priority of invention provide an incentive for early filing. Under U.S. law one
who invents first (the “senior inventor”) may lose priority, and hence the patent,
to one who invents later (the “junior inventor”) if the senior inventor deliberately
suppresses or conceals the invention; indeed, mere passage of time has been held
to give rise to an inference of deliberate suppression or concealment.69 Countries
that use the first-to-file rather than the first-to-invent rule in force in the United
States even more vigorously discourage wasteful rent-seeking by promoting
earlier filing, albeit perhaps creating other problems.70
Another characteristic of the patenting process also permits rent seeking
longer than might be desirable from an economic perspective. That is the secrecy
of the application and patent office review process.71 The primary purpose of
secrecy, which has been said to be “close to the core of the patent system,” is to
avoid deterring inventors “from seeking patent protection in the first place” and
opting for trade secret protection.72 Since rival firms will not normally know, or
at least often cannot be sure, that a patent application has been filed, they may be
inclined to continue R&D even though they will later learn, on issuance of the
patent, that they should have ceased or redirected their R&D efforts. Of course, a
firm may issue a press statement on a new invention, indicating that a patent
to substain patentability. To say that the putative invention is obvious is to say that the
contribution is deemed inadequate.
68 See Kitch, supra note 47 at 269–70.
69 Peter D. Rosenberg, Patent Law Fundamentals, Vol. 2, §10.04[4]. Similarly, the rule barring
patentability of inventions that have been in public use or on sale for more than one year also
discourages delayed patenting. 35 USC. §102(b).
70 See Gregory J. Wrenn, What Should Be Our Priority—Protection for the First to File or the First
to Invent?, 72 J. of Pat. Off. Soc. 872 (1990). A central problem created by a first-to-file system
from an economic viewpoint would likely be less disclosure in the patent itself, say with respect
to “best mode,” because the applicant might feel forced to file without taking time to determine
how best to use the invention. See discussion of the economic function of enablement and best
mode disclosure infra at 20. It is possible to combine a first-to-file system with delayed disclosure
mandated as a condition of final issuance of the patent, thereby seeking the “best of both worlds.”
See Report of Advisory Comm. on Patent Law Reform 53 (1992), which recommended however
abolishing the best mode requirement. See also Report of President’s Comm. on the Patent
System, “To Promote the Progress of...useful Arts” 8–9 (1966).
71 35 USC. §12.2.
72 Iron & Sears v. Dann, 606 F.2d 1215, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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application has been filed or shortly will be filed, and many firms place “patent
pending” notices on new products, thereby tending to reduce rent seeking by
others.73
Whether secrecy is thus a significant contributor to rent seeking is uncertain.
If secrecy is judged to create such a problem, one possible solution would be to
publish applications as advice to rival R&D organizations so that they could
assess the likelihood of patent issuance and then cease or redirect R&D
expenditures, thereby reducing waste. It seems likely, however, that such a
procedural change would lead to either a formal or informal pre-grant
opposition practice before the patent examiner. Such pre-grant opposition might
stimulate rent-seeking in the form of legal expenditures to block patent grants
but without necessarily reducing rival R&D expenditures wherever there was a
question about the patentability of the putative invention.74
V.
A patent system operates over time. To be an efficient system it must
optimize the flow of innovation over time. The patent system must thus balance
innovation today against innovation tomorrow. This objective is complementary
to the objective of reducing rent seeking. A patent system should not only avoid
wasteful competitive R&D but it should also avoid encroaching on future R&D
that is socially desirable.
Patent law does indeed contain a number of rules that, balancing innovation
today against innovation tomorrow, limit the encroachment on future R&D.
Most obvious are those rules--novelty and nonobviousness--that limit the scope
of the patent to what has actually been invented. Rules that would allow the
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The legal function of a “patent pending” notice is murky. Although 35 U..S.C. §287 makes the
marking of a patented article a prerequisite to the recovery of damages against an infringer who
does not have actual notice of the patent, a “patent pending” notice does not accomplish the
statutory result. State Industries, Inc. v. A. O. Smith, 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985). At most
such a notice constitutes notice that “the marked articles...may be subject to incohate patent rights
and future protection.” Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 784 F. Supp. 648, 675 (E.D. Mo.
1992). See however an older case, Steinhal v. Arlington Sample Book Co., 94 F.2d 748 (3d Cir.
1938). Thus, a “patent pending” notice is today more a commercial than a legal instrument.
74 In Japan the requirement of disclosing patent applications leads to pre-grant opposition in
numerous cases, see Janusz A. Ordover, A Patent System for Both Diffusion and Exclusion, 5 J. of
Econ. Perspectives 43, 45–46 (1991). A recent Advisory Commission reporting to the Secretary of
Commerce, although recognizing that publication is sometimes unduly delayed, resisted
shortening the period beyond 24 months from filing. Advisory Comm. on Patent Law Reform 61–
62 (1992). From the standpoint of discouraging rent seeking, publication of applications is in a
sense a half-way house to a first-to-file system, discussed supra at 18.
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patent to reach beyond the inventor’s contribution would discourage innovation
by others in the intervening area.75
Professor Kitch has pointed out that at least with respect to so-called pioneer
inventions a patent may extend beyond what the inventor has actually reduced
to practice. Kitch argues that this “prospecting function” of the patent system is
desirable because it leads to more efficiency in investment subsequent to patent
issuance through exclusive ownership of the right to exploit the invention,
including the power to organize industry-wide exploitation through licensing.76
Kitch’s thesis in this respect has been criticized as not representing the reality of
patent law and practice.77
Whatever the merits of the dispute between Kitch and his critics, it is
important that the line between the patented and the unpatented be clearly
demarcated in the patent itself, rather than being left to future litigation, so that a
green light is given to R&D beyond that line. The patent system accomplishes
this result not only by complex rules that have been worked out about what can
and cannot be claimed but also by the craft of patent lawyers who have
developed the skill of drafting so that the claims cover what is intended, no more
and no less.
In a number of smaller ways the patent system avoids unduly inhibiting
innovation over time. Since most scientists and engineers do their R&D work
without patent lawyers at their sides, their normal work should not be hampered
by unexpected patents. In this respect the nonobviousness requirement plays an
important prophylactic role. It sharply limits littering of the innovation
landscape with land mines consisting of patents on what those skilled in the
trade would assume to be in the public domain.
Another way in which the patent system promotes future innovation is
through public disclosure. Upon issuance, a patent communicates a considerable
amount of information that can help other would-be inventors including rival
firms. Beyond the patent claims, which may speak volumes to those skilled in the
art, the requirement that the disclosure be enabling--that is, that it enable one
skilled in the art to make and use the invention78--normally assures that the
75

On the other hand, too narrow protection could lead inventors to choose trade secret as
opposed to patent protection, thereby adversely affecting subsquent innovation. Suzanne
Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. of
Econ. Perspectives 29, 39 (1991).
76 Kitch, supra note 47, at 275-280, 285–86.
77 Roger L. Beck, The Prospect Theory of the Patent System and Unproductive Competition, 5
Res. in Law and Econ. 193 (1983); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science, 56 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1017, 1042 n. 108, 1043 n. 114 and n. 117 (1989).
78 35 USC. §112.
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patent document is not so abstract as to be useless to the skilled reader.79 Finally,
the further requirement that the specification state the “best mode contemplated
by the inventor of carrying out his invention” carries the disclosure further in a
way that may push practical technical knowledge ahead more rapidly than
would otherwise be the case and promote invention by others.80
VI.
An important part of the argument above is that the courts have done a
reasonably good job, consciously or unconsciously, of applying an economic
approach in patent cases. It was not always so.
U.S. patent law has developed over two centuries. For a dozen or more
decades it was a specialized field, treated with respect by courts of general
jurisdiction, which did not challenge its basic precepts. One can read Nineteenth
Century patent cases, even of the Supreme Court, with the sense that the courts
were dealing with a subject akin to private law, recognizing perhaps that patents
were property rights.
In the Twentieth Century, however, the Supreme Court began to treat patent
law issues as public policy issues. More specifically, the Court viewed patent law
as public law in which it should fashion new rules to achieve what it considered
desirable public policy goals. This attitude shows up most strongly in antitrust
cases. Here the confusion between patents and monopolies was the core of the
problem.
The formula that a patent is a monopoly shows up repeatedly in Supreme
Court antitrust cases.81 To be sure, the Court recognized as early as the 1958
79

The judicially developed doctrine that a person skilled in the art must be able to make or use
the invention without undue experimentation, In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991), also
appears calculated to avoid wasteful R&D expenditures.
80 35 USC. §112; see Imperial Chemical Industries v. Barr Laboratories, 795 F.Supp. 619, 625
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (through the enablement and best mode requirements “the public benefits by the
advance of science and the useful arts”). For a thoughtful criticism of the best mode requirement,
suggesting that the “subjective” quality of the requirement leads to litigation costs exceeding
disclosure value, see Report of the Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform 100-103 (1992)
On the important issue of when follow-on improvements should be patentable, especially to the
extent that the enablement and best mode disclosures of the prior patent foreshadow the
improvement, see the “signaling” discussion in Mark F. Grady and Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law
and Rent Dissipation, 78 Va. L. Rev. 305 (1992), and Robert L. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent
District, 78 Va. L. Rev. 359, 360-365 (1992).
81 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 US 392, 395 (1947): (“The...patents confer a limited
monopoly....”); Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppinger Co., 314 US 488, 491 (1942) (“[R]espondent is
making use of its patent monopoly....”) See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
395 US 100, 135-136 (1969).
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Northern Pacific case that “it is common knowledge that a patent does not
always confer a monopoly over a particular commodity.”82 But even after
Northern Pacific antitrust policy hostility to patents continued in the Supreme
Court to as late as 1984, when it warned against “[a]ny effort to enlarge the scope
of the patent monopoly by using the market power it confers to restrain
competition in the market for a second product....”83
If this hostility had been limited to antitrust cases, it might not have been so
serious because “the patent equals monopoly” formula tended to be used to
bolster a per se approach to tie-ins and more generally to provide a base for the
now heavily discredited leverage theory.84 The same hostility toward patents
was to be found, however, in patent validity cases as well. The concurring
opinion of Justice Douglas in the Supermarket case is an example, perhaps
extreme:
Every patent is the grant of a privilege of exacting tolls from the
public....Congress never sanctioned the patenting of gadgets....The fact
that a patent as flimsy and as spurious as this one has to be brought all the
way to this Court to be declared invalid dramatically illustrates how far
our patent system frequently departs from the constitutional standards
which are supposed to govern.85
The Court’s hostility to patents was so great that Justice Jackson was led to
complain that “the only patent that is valid is one which this Court has not been
able to get its hands on.”86 The Court operationalized this hostility in patent (as
opposed to antitrust) cases not through a monopoly analysis as such but rather
through the technique of raising the standard of invention by importing such
exotic standards as “the flash of creative genius” test.87 But when legislation
eliminated such tests in favor of a simpler and easier to meet “nonobviousness”
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Northern Pacific Railway Co., v. United States, 356 US 1, 10 n. 8 (1958).
Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 US 2, 16 (1984).
84 On the shortcomings of the leverage theory, see Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 172-174
(1973); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 Yale L.J. 19
(1947). But see the effort to rehabilitate the leverage theory in part in Louis Kaplow, Extension of
Monopoly Power through Leverage, 85 Col. L. Rev. 515 (1985).
85 A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 US 147, 154, 155, 158. The Douglas
opinion reveals that he thought that patents had to “serve the ends of science” by “making a
distinctive contribution to scientific knowledge.” Id. at 154 Douglas apparently overlooked the
Constitutional purpose of advancing the “useful Arts.”
86 Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 US 560, 571, 572 (dissenting opinion).
87 Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 US 84, 91 (1941).
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test in 1952,88 the federal courts, following the Supreme Court’s leadership,
continued to invalidate the majority of patents arising in infringement
litigation.89
The establishment of the Federal Circuit in 1982 through legislation created a
new framework for the administration of the patent laws. In lieu of patent cases
coming before the various unspecialized regional federal Courts of Appeals, a
new specialized federal appellate court, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, was established.90 In general, it was granted exclusive authority over,
among other things, patent appeals from Federal district courts as well as from
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences of the Patent Office.91
The creation of the Federal Circuit put an end to Supreme Court-created
irrationalities in the patent laws in several ways. First, the legislation, by
eliminating most opporunities for a conflict in circuits, did away as a practical
matter with Supreme Court jurisdiction in patent cases.92 Second, the Federal
Circuit, which thereby became effectively the final voice on patent law, resisted
the monopoly characterization of patents, even in the antitrust context. Early in
its life it declared unequivocally, “The patent system, which antedates the
Sherman Act by a century, is not an ‘exception’ to the antitrust law, and patent
rights are not legal monopolies in the antitrust sense of that word.”93 Today the
unchallenged leadership of the Federal Circuit, as the highest patent court of the
land, has led not only to greater respect for patents and a higher percentage of
validity judgments in favor of patentees but also less of a gun-slinging attitude
toward patent issues.94
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See the addition in 35 USC. §103 of a sentence stating: “Patentability shall not be negatived by
the manner in which the invention is made.”
89 Lawrence Baum, The Federal Courts and Patent Validity: An Analysis of the Record, 56 J. of
the Pat. Off. Soc. 758, 760-762 (1974).
90 Federal Courts Improvements Act of 1982, P.L. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). For a general review
of the role and performance of the Federal Circuit, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfus, The Federal
Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1 (1989). For a detailed analysis of
the Federal Circuit’s decisions, see Robert L. Harmon, Patents and the Federal Circuit (2d ed.
1991).
91 For details, see Robert L. Harmon, Patents and the Federal Circuit 495–554 (2d ed. 1991).
92 With exclusive appellate review of patent cases in the Federal Circuit, a split in circuits on a
patent issue is unlikely.
93 American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (emphasis
in original). In Abbott Laboratories v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1355 (1991), the Federal Circuit
held that a patent gave rise to no “presumption of market power.” The Justice Department has
accepted the Federal Circuit’s approach in this respect. See the Antitrust Division’s Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for Int’l Operations §3.6 (1988).
94 See generally Ronald B. Coolley, What the Federal Circuit Has Done and How Often, 71 J. of
Pat. Off. Soc. 385 (1989); Kastriner, supra note 37.
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On the other hand, the Federal Circuit has tended to take a narrow technical
view in its opinions, thereby masking the policy issues at stake. Economic
considerations seldom emerge on the surface of the reported opinions.95 Yet the
economic considerations underlying patent doctrines need not be stated in
technical economic terms. For example, in the recent ICI case, the Southern
District of New York made clear in simple and straightforward language the
economic role of the enablement and best mode requirements in balancing
innovation today against innovation tomorrow: “One of the main reasons for the
Patent Code is to encourage inventors to make the necessary disclosures to
permit others to advance the art; inventors may not keep secret information
intended for that purpose.”96
Because patent law is so crucial to the economic system and because patent
doctrines play such an important role in shaping how patent law promotes
innovation while minimizing problems associated with the power to exclude, the
economic role of patent law deserves greater attention from the courts. Although
the Federal Circuit is by design a specialized court, we can anticipate that that
court will become more explicit about the economic underpinnings of patent
doctrines. At a time when public focus on technology and the role of government
in promoting it has never been higher, it would serve neither the patent system
nor public policy toward technology to obscure the role of the patent system in a
thicket of technical patent law rules unapproachable by those unskilled in that
arcane art.

95

An exception, and in any event limited to a standing issue on appeal from a District Court case,
is Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 934–35 (Fed. Cir. 1991) For another
exception see also a trademark case involving antitrust counterclaims, US Philips Corp. v.
Windmere Corp., 861 F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir. 1988). See also the reference to In re Longi, supra at note
43.
96 Imperial Chemical Industries v. Barr Laboratories, 795 F.Supp. 619, 621 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Simple
as this formulation is, the economic purpose of permitting others to innovate is rarely advanced
as a purpose of the best mode requirement. See, e.g., the exhaustive article by Kenneth R. Adams,
What’s Better, What’s Best–The Best Mode Requirement in U.S. Patent Practice, 73 J. of Pat. Off.
Soc. 811 (1991), esp. at 812–13.
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